This page tracks the current status of the Strait of Hormuz and explains what “closed,” “disrupted,” or “at risk” actually means in practical terms for shipping, oil markets, and trade.
Is the Strait of Hormuz Closed Today? Understanding the “Selective Closure”
As of March 18, 2026, the answer to whether the Strait of Hormuz is closed is not a simple yes or no. The waterway that normally carries one-fifth of the world’s oil is neither fully open nor completely shut. Instead, it exists in a precarious state of what analysts call “selective closure”—a situation where Iran allows passage only for vessels it deems friendly while denying access to others.
This article examines the current status of the strait, how it is being managed, and what this means for global shipping.
The Official Position: Mixed Messages from Tehran
Iran’s leadership has sent deliberately ambiguous signals about the strait’s status since the conflict began. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on March 16 that the waterway is “open, but closed to our enemies”—a formulation that leaves enormous room for interpretation. Just weeks earlier, a spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had warned that any ship attempting passage would be “set ablaze.”
This apparent contradiction reflects Iran’s strategic approach. By maintaining ambiguity, Tehran preserves maximum flexibility while keeping adversaries uncertain about its red lines. The new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has called for the continued closure of the strait as a tool of leverage against the United States and Israel, but on-the-ground evidence suggests a more nuanced reality.
What the Tracking Data Shows
Maritime intelligence firms tracking vessel movements have documented a small but significant flow of ships through the strait in recent days.
Windward, a maritime intelligence company, reported that at least five non-Iranian ships transited the strait between March 15 and 16. These vessels took an unusual route—passing through Iranian territorial waters via the Larak-Qeshm Channel near the Iranian coast, rather than using the standard international navigation channels. This deviation from normal practice suggests coordination with Iranian authorities.
By March 16, Windward detected eight non-Iranian-flagged vessels in the strait with their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) turned on—nearly double the numbers seen earlier in the week. MarineTraffic, another tracking service, recorded nine transits over March 15-16, compared with just five over the previous two-day period.
These numbers, while increased, remain a tiny fraction of normal traffic. Before the war, the strait typically saw 50 to 70 oil and gas tankers daily, plus numerous container ships and bulk carriers. Today, overall traffic is down by approximately 95 to 97 percent.
Who Is Getting Through?
The vessels successfully transiting share common characteristics: they are flagged to nations with diplomatic channels to Tehran.
Pakistan: The Pakistan-flagged crude oil tanker Karachi became one of the first visible non-Iranian crossings when it sailed through the strait into the Gulf of Oman around March 15. Importantly, the Karachi transited with its AIS system on—a decision that signaled confidence in safe passage, as most vessels have been keeping their transponders off to avoid detection.
India: Two Indian-flagged LPG carriers successfully traversed the strait over the preceding weekend and reached Indian ports. Their passage followed reported talks between Indian and Iranian officials.
Turkey: Turkey’s Transport Minister confirmed that a Turkish vessel received Iranian permission and successfully transited the strait.
China: While specific Chinese-flagged vessels have not been highlighted in recent tracking data, analysts note that the majority of crude oil moving through the strait is destined for China. JPMorgan commodity analysts observed that the selective passage system appears designed to allow shipments to continue for Iran’s key customer.
The vessels granted passage share another characteristic: nearly all of the bulk carriers tracked eastbound through the strait had previously called at Iran’s Imam Khomeini port, suggesting they were engaged in trade with Iran itself.
The “Permission-Based” System
What has emerged is effectively a permit system for transit. Maritime intelligence firm Windward describes it as “permission-based transit and control,” with Iran exerting authority to approve or deny passage on a case-by-case basis.
This system operates through informal channels rather than any publicly announced procedure. Vessels seeking passage appear to require diplomatic clearance arranged between their home countries and Tehran. The process likely involves verification of ownership, cargo, and destination—with ships affiliated with the United States or its allies presumably being denied.
JPMorgan analyst Natasha Kaneva noted that the use of the Larak-Qeshm Channel, a non-standard route, “may reflect a process to verify vessel ownership and cargo, allowing ships not affiliated with the US or its allies to pass.”
What About Everyone Else?
For the vast majority of commercial shipping, the strait remains effectively closed. Approximately 1,100 ships are now reported to be waiting in Gulf waters, including roughly 250 oil tankers, unable to transit due to security risks and insurance prohibitions.
Shipping companies and insurers have largely avoided the area. Even if a vessel’s home country has diplomatic relations with Iran, the risks of misjudgment, accidental targeting, or being caught in military operations remain too high for most commercial operators. The few ships moving through are either those with explicit clearance or vessels willing to take extraordinary risks.
Some ships have adopted “dark transit” tactics, switching off tracking systems entirely while passing through. These movements are often associated with the so-called “shadow fleet”—aging, poorly maintained vessels operating outside formal regulatory frameworks that have continued to move oil despite the disruption. For legitimate commercial shipping, this is not a viable option.
The Military Dimension
While Iran controls passage through its selective system, the United States is attempting to organize a military response. President Donald Trump has announced that he is demanding approximately seven countries heavily reliant on Middle East oil join a coalition to escort vessels through the strait.
“The White House plans to announce a multinational coalition as soon as this week,” The Wall Street Journal reported, citing US officials. Trump has stated that “many countries, especially those who are affected by Iran’s attempted closure of the Hormuz Strait, will be sending Warships” to secure the trade route.
Publicly, however, many governments have been reluctant to commit to such a mission before hostilities end, given the obvious risks. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius articulated the dilemma earlier in March, questioning what European escort ships could achieve “that the mighty US Navy itself cannot.”
The US military has meanwhile taken action to reduce threats to shipping, announcing on March 17 that it had dropped bunker buster bombs on “hardened” Iranian missile sites located near the strait. US Central Command stated that “the Iranian anti-ship cruise missiles in these sites posed a risk to international shipping.”
Why Selective Closure?
Iran’s approach of selective rather than total closure reflects careful strategic calculation. A complete shutdown would trigger immediate and severe retaliation, likely including military action to reopen the waterway. It would also cut off Iran’s own oil exports—approximately 90 percent of which normally pass through the strait—devastating the Iranian economy.
By maintaining controlled passage, Iran achieves multiple objectives simultaneously. It demonstrates its ability to dominate this strategic chokepoint, pressures adversaries by disrupting their supply chains, rewards friendly nations with continued access, and preserves its own exports to China, its primary customer. All of this is accomplished without crossing the threshold that would guarantee a major military response.
As The New Arab noted in its analysis, this approach “allows Iran to exert pressure on global energy markets without triggering the full consequences of a complete shutdown.”
The View from Washington
The Trump administration faces a difficult choice. It has stated it does not require international assistance to secure the waterway—Trump said on March 17 that Washington could act alone if necessary. Yet the administration is simultaneously pressing allies to join a coalition, suggesting a desire to share both the burden and the political responsibility.
Trump has criticized NATO partners for rebuffing his proposals, telling reporters: “Despite the fact that we helped them so much—we have thousands of soldiers in different countries all over the world—they don’t want to help us, which is amazing.”
The administration’s planning reportedly includes discussions about whether escort operations would begin before or after hostilities end—a critical distinction that affects both the feasibility and the legality of any intervention.
Conclusion
So, is the Strait of Hormuz closed today? The most accurate answer is that the strait is closed to general commercial shipping but open on a selective, permission-only basis to vessels from countries that have negotiated access with Iran.
For a typical oil tanker seeking to carry Saudi or UAE crude to Europe or Asia, the strait is effectively impassable. The risks are too high, insurance is unavailable, and no escort protection yet exists. For an Iranian oil tanker carrying crude to China, or an Indian LPG carrier whose government has negotiated passage, the strait is open—though the journey requires navigating a war zone with all the attendant dangers.
This selective closure represents a new reality for the world’s most critical oil chokepoint. The strait is no longer functioning as a neutral international passage guaranteed by maritime law and naval patrols. Instead, it has become a strategic tool in a wider conflict—a tool wielded by Tehran to reward friends, pressure enemies, and demonstrate that in this narrow waterway, Iran’s permission matters.
As long as the war continues, this is likely to remain the status quo: a strait that is neither fully open nor completely closed, but precisely as open as Iran chooses to make it, for exactly whom it chooses to let through.