Hormuz Dependency Score

Hormuz Dependency Score — Global Oil Chokepoint Exposure Index
LIVE INTELLIGENCE TOOL — CHOKEPOINT ANALYSIS v2.1

Hormuz Dependency Score

Global oil chokepoint exposure index. Measures each nation’s vulnerability to a Strait of Hormuz disruption across four risk vectors.

DATA SOURCES
EIA · IEA · BP Statistical Review
World Bank · IMF · DoE/SPR Data

LAST UPDATED
Q4 2024 / March 2025
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INDEX v2.1 — Q4 2024

What Is the Hormuz Dependency Score?

The Hormuz Dependency Score (HDS) is a composite index that quantifies how exposed any country is to a disruption of oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz — the world’s most critical energy chokepoint. It combines four risk vectors into a single 0–100 score: crude oil import exposure, LNG supply vulnerability, strategic petroleum reserve buffer, and macroeconomic sensitivity.

Roughly 21 million barrels of oil per day — about 21% of global petroleum consumption — transit the Strait of Hormuz. A sustained closure or partial disruption would not merely raise fuel prices: it would trigger supply rationing, currency crises, industrial shutdowns, and humanitarian emergencies across dozens of nations simultaneously. The HDS was built to make that risk legible, country by country.

Unlike narrative geopolitical assessments, the HDS is quantitative, reproducible, and comparable across all sovereign states. Whether you are a policy researcher, energy analyst, investor, or simply a curious citizen, this tool answers a single pointed question: if the Strait of Hormuz closed tomorrow, how badly would your country be hit?

21 Mb/d Daily oil flow through Hormuz
20% Share of global LNG trade transiting Hormuz
160+ Countries scored in this index
4 Risk vectors in the composite HDS model
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Oil Import Exposure

The percentage of a country’s total crude oil imports that originate from, or transit through, Hormuz-adjacent producers: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, the UAE, and Qatar. A country sourcing 90% of its crude from Gulf states faces near-total supply disruption if the strait closes; one sourcing primarily from North Sea, West African, or Western Hemisphere producers faces mainly a price shock rather than a physical shortage.

Weight in HDS: 35%. Crude import origin is the single largest driver of physical vulnerability because refined products flow from crude — interrupt the feedstock and refinery output collapses within days.

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LNG Supply Exposure

The share of a country’s liquefied natural gas imports sourced from Gulf producers — primarily Qatar, the world’s largest LNG exporter, along with the UAE and Oman. Qatar’s LNG terminals on the eastern coast of the peninsula export exclusively through Hormuz. A closure would simultaneously cut Europe’s piped-gas alternatives, Asia’s power generation feedstocks, and global LNG spot markets.

Weight in HDS: 20%. LNG carries a slightly lower weight than crude because many importers have greater gas storage flexibility and alternative pipeline access, though for countries like Japan and South Korea, LNG exposure rivals crude exposure in severity.

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SPR Buffer Days

The number of days a country’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve — combined with commercial stock obligations — can sustain consumption without new imports. The IEA mandates member states hold a minimum of 90 days of net import cover. Countries below this threshold face acute vulnerability within weeks of any supply disruption; those above it can coordinate international release programs and negotiate alternative supply contracts before true shortages materialize.

Weight in HDS: 25% (inverted — higher SPR days reduce the score). SPR buffer is the primary policy lever governments control directly. The United States holds the world’s largest reserve at ~170 days; Pakistan holds approximately 3 days.

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Economic Vulnerability

A composite sub-score (0–100) measuring the macro-structural sensitivity of a country’s economy to an oil price spike and potential supply shock. Sub-components include: energy intensity of GDP, trade openness and current account position, foreign exchange reserve adequacy, fiscal oil-revenue dependence, and the substitutability of petroleum in key economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, transport).

Weight in HDS: 20%. Two countries with identical import exposure can face wildly different outcomes depending on whether they hold sufficient dollar reserves to finance emergency spot purchases, and whether their industrial base can absorb fuel rationing without cascading employment losses.

The World’s Most Important 33 Miles of Water

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway separating the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman, bordered by Iran to the north and the United Arab Emirates and Oman to the south. At its narrowest point it is approximately 33 miles wide, with two-mile-wide shipping lanes in each direction separated by a two-mile buffer zone.

Every day, roughly 17 to 21 super-tankers pass through, carrying oil from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, the UAE, and Qatar to refineries and power plants across Asia, Europe, and beyond. Qatar’s entire LNG export capacity — the gas powering German factories, Japanese power plants, and South Korean petrochemical complexes — transits exclusively through Hormuz.

Historical Threat Context

The “Tanker War” of the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq conflict saw attacks on hundreds of commercial vessels in the Gulf. Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the strait in response to economic sanctions. The 2019 attacks on tankers near Fujairah, and Houthi strikes on shipping in 2023–2024, demonstrated that even the credible threat of disruption significantly moves global energy markets — a full closure would be an unprecedented economic shock.

No Easy Alternative

Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline (Petroline) carries approximately 5 Mb/d to Yanbu on the Red Sea — providing a partial bypass for Saudi exports only. The UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) to Fujairah has 1.5 Mb/d capacity. Combined, these bypasses cover roughly one-third of current Hormuz flows — leaving the global economy exposed for the remaining two-thirds with no realistic alternative routing.

Reading the Hormuz Dependency Score Card

Each country card shows four metrics and one composite score. Here is how to interpret them in combination rather than isolation.

High Oil + Low SPR = Critical Physical Risk

Countries like Japan (92% oil exposure, 145-day SPR) face severe disruption but have substantial time to negotiate emergency alternatives. Countries like Pakistan (72% oil exposure, 3-day SPR) face immediate physical shortages with no buffer whatsoever — supply disruption becomes humanitarian crisis within days, not weeks.

Low Oil + High LNG = Hidden Vulnerability

Some European economies appear insulated from crude disruption but face significant LNG vulnerability. Qatar supplies a large share of European regasification terminal throughput. A Hormuz closure that prevents LNG shipments would hit electricity and industrial gas markets even in countries with diversified crude sources.

Producer States: Inverted Exposure

Oil-exporting nations — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Norway — score very low on import vulnerability but face a different Hormuz risk: the inability to export. Their economic vulnerability scores reflect the fiscal shock of lost export revenues rather than supply shortages. For these countries, Hormuz closure is an economic weapon turned against themselves.

Score Tiers

80–100: Critical. Likely shortages within 30 days of closure. 60–79: High. Severe price shock, rationing risk within 60–90 days. 40–59: Moderate. Significant economic pain, manageable with emergency reserves and diversification. 0–39: Low/Minimal. Primarily price transmission effects; physical supply security maintained.

Vector Weight Data Sources Notes
Oil Import Exposure 35% EIA, IEA, BP Statistical Review, national customs data Origin-based; includes transit volumes through Hormuz from non-Gulf producers where applicable. Updated annually from latest IEA World Energy Balances.
LNG Supply Exposure 20% GIIGNL Annual Report, IEA Gas Market Report, Kpler trade data Reflects share of LNG imports from Qatar, UAE, and Oman as proportion of total gas supply. Countries with pipeline-only gas supply score near zero.
SPR Buffer (inverted) 25% IEA Oil Security, DoE/SPR data, national energy ministry reports Measured in days of net import cover. Score = max(0, 100 − (days/200)×100). IEA 90-day minimum used as calibration benchmark. Producer nations assigned ∞ (score: 0).
Economic Vulnerability 20% World Bank, IMF WEO, IEA Energy Intensity, OECD Composite of energy intensity, FX reserve adequacy, fiscal oil dependence, trade openness, and import substitutability. Scored 0–100 by analyst model.
Composite HDS HDS = (Oil × 0.35) + (LNG × 0.20) + (SPR_score × 0.25) + (Econ × 0.20). Rounded to nearest integer. Range: 0–100.
What countries are most dependent on the Strait of Hormuz?
The most Hormuz-dependent import economies are concentrated in East and South Asia. Japan tops the list with 92% of its crude imports from Hormuz-transiting routes combined with 85% LNG exposure from Qatar — giving it an HDS of approximately 88. South Korea (HDS ~83), Taiwan (HDS ~82), and Singapore (HDS ~72) follow closely. Among larger economies, India’s critically low SPR of just 9 days creates acute physical vulnerability despite partial supply diversification. Pakistan and Yemen score in the critical tier (80+) due to near-zero reserves combined with high import dependence. Within the Middle East, Jordan and Lebanon score very high due to zero domestic production and minimal storage.
How much oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz every day?
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), approximately 21 million barrels of oil per day (Mb/d) flowed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2023, representing about 21% of global petroleum liquids consumption. This includes crude oil, condensate, and refined products. In addition, roughly 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade transits through the strait — almost entirely from Qatar’s North Field, the world’s largest single natural gas reservoir. The combined oil and gas value flowing through Hormuz daily exceeds $1.5 billion at current commodity prices.
Has the Strait of Hormuz ever been closed?
The strait has never been fully closed, but it has been severely disrupted. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the “Tanker War” phase saw over 400 vessels attacked, causing insurance premiums to spike dramatically and requiring US Navy escorts for reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. In 2019, attacks on tankers near Fujairah (attributed to Iran) and the seizure of a British tanker temporarily spiked Brent crude prices. Houthi drone and missile attacks on Red Sea shipping in 2023–2024, while targeting the Bab el-Mandeb rather than Hormuz proper, demonstrated how chokepoint disruption cascades through global freight markets. Iran has explicitly threatened full closure on multiple occasions, most recently in 2019 and 2022.
Which countries would be least affected by a Hormuz closure?
Countries with the lowest Hormuz Dependency Scores are those that combine domestic production, diversified import sources, and large strategic reserves. Norway (a major oil and gas exporter, HDS ~5) would actually benefit from higher global prices. Canada (HDS ~8) draws primarily from domestic Alberta oil sands and Atlantic imports. Brazil (HDS ~12) relies on massive pre-salt offshore production from Petrobras. The United States (HDS ~22) has been transformed by the shale revolution into a net LNG exporter with substantial SPR coverage. Within developing nations, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, and Angola are net exporters with minimal Hormuz import exposure, though some face their own structural economic vulnerabilities.
What is a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and why does it matter?
A Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is a government-mandated stockpile of crude oil and/or refined petroleum products held specifically to manage supply disruptions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) requires member countries to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports. These reserves act as a shock absorber: when supply chains are interrupted, governments can release SPR volumes into the market to suppress price spikes and prevent physical shortages while alternative supply routes are arranged. The U.S. SPR at ~170 days is the world’s largest. At the other extreme, Pakistan holds approximately 3 days and India approximately 9 days — both dramatically below the IEA minimum, creating acute vulnerability windows that would be measured in days rather than months.
How does a Hormuz closure affect countries that don’t import Gulf oil?
Even countries with little or no direct Gulf oil dependence face significant second-order effects from a Hormuz disruption. Global oil prices are set on commodity exchanges using Brent and WTI benchmarks — a Hormuz shock that removes 20% of global supply would spike prices for all buyers regardless of origin. Countries in South America, West Africa, and Europe that source oil domestically or from non-Gulf producers would still see their fuel and energy costs rise sharply. Additionally, manufacturing supply chains are globally integrated: a Japanese auto plant that shuts due to fuel shortages affects component suppliers from Mexico to Germany. The HDS economic vulnerability score partially captures these transmission effects, but the true global impact of a full Hormuz closure would be far broader than any single-country metric can capture.
Why does Qatar’s LNG make Hormuz uniquely important for gas markets?
Qatar operates the world’s largest LNG export complex at Ras Laffan, fed by the North Field — the world’s single largest natural gas reservoir, holding approximately 1,760 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas. Qatar exports approximately 77 million tonnes of LNG per year (2023), equivalent to roughly 20% of global LNG trade, primarily to Japan, South Korea, China, India, and Europe. Crucially, all Qatar LNG must transit Hormuz — there is no pipeline export alternative for Qatari gas. A Hormuz closure would simultaneously remove Qatar’s entire LNG export capacity from the market, triggering gas price spikes across Asia and Europe simultaneously. Unlike crude oil, LNG cannot easily be rerouted or replaced in the short term due to regasification terminal constraints.
How is the Hormuz Dependency Score different from other energy security indices?
Most energy security indices — such as the IEA’s Energy Security Assessment or the World Energy Council’s Energy Trilemma Index — measure broad energy security across all dimensions including renewables, infrastructure, and affordability. The HDS is narrowly scoped to a single, specific risk scenario: a Strait of Hormuz disruption. This makes it more actionable for geopolitical risk analysis and crisis scenario planning. It also applies consistently across all 160+ countries using the same four-vector model, enabling direct cross-country comparison on a single axis of risk. The HDS does not measure general energy poverty, electrification rates, or renewable transition progress — only chokepoint-specific import vulnerability.

All 160+ countries scored in the Hormuz Dependency Index. Select any country to view its full exposure card.

CHOKEPOINT GEOGRAPHY

The Persian Gulf Bottleneck

Six of the world’s top oil exporters — Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar — share a single exit point to global markets. The Strait of Hormuz is 33 miles wide at its narrowest; the navigable shipping lanes are just 2 miles wide in each direction. There is no credible alternative route for the majority of this volume: the Petroline bypass covers ~5 Mb/d of Saudi exports only, leaving 16+ Mb/d with no alternative routing.

MILITARY & SANCTIONS DYNAMICS

Iran’s Closure Capability

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy maintains extensive anti-ship missile systems, fast attack craft, and sea mine capabilities specifically designed to threaten Hormuz shipping. Iran has explicitly invoked closure threats in response to sanctions pressure in 2008, 2011, 2012, 2018, and 2019. US 5th Fleet, based in Bahrain, maintains constant presence to deter and respond — but even temporary disruption lasting days would severely move global energy markets.

ENERGY TRANSITION IMPLICATIONS

How Renewables Reduce — but Don’t Eliminate — Hormuz Risk

The global energy transition is gradually reducing Hormuz dependency for electricity generation as solar, wind, and nuclear replace gas-fired power plants. However, transport fuel — aviation, heavy shipping, road freight — remains almost entirely petroleum-dependent, with no credible alternative at scale before 2035 at the earliest. For most countries, the energy transition reduces gas exposure faster than oil exposure, leaving crude oil import vulnerability as the persistent chokepoint risk for the next decade.

DATA SOURCES & CURRENCY: Oil import origin data from IEA World Energy Balances (2023 edition) and EIA Country Energy Profiles. LNG trade data from GIIGNL Annual LNG Report 2024 and IEA Gas Market Report Q2 2024. SPR data from IEA Oil Security publication and national energy ministry disclosures. Economic vulnerability sub-scores derived from IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2024), World Bank World Development Indicators, and IEA Energy Efficiency Indicators. All scores reflect best-available data as of Q4 2024. Producer-state export volumes from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2024.
DISCLAIMER: The Hormuz Dependency Score is a modeled analytical estimate for research, educational, and informational purposes only. Scores are constructed from publicly available data sources and involve analytical judgments in the economic vulnerability sub-score component. This index is not intended for use in financial trading, investment decisions, insurance underwriting, or official government policy. Energy trade data involves significant reporting lags; scores reflect conditions as of Q4 2024 and should be interpreted accordingly. Countries classified as exporters (SPR = ∞) face inverted Hormuz risk through export revenue disruption rather than import supply disruption — a dynamic not fully captured in the import-focused HDS framework.